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AGAINST INTERPRETIVE SUPREMACY 
Saikrishna Prakash* and John Yoo** 
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW. By Larry D. Kramer. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 2004. Pp. xii, 363. Cloth, $29.95. 
Many constitutional scholars are obsessed with judicial review and 
the many questions surrounding it.1 One perennial favorite is whether 
the Constitution even authorizes judicial review. Another is whether 
the other branches of the federal government must obey the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Constitution and what, if anything, the 
other branches must do to execute the judiciary's judgments. Marbury 
v. Madison2 has been a full-employment program for many 
constitutional law scholars, including ourselves. 
Larry Kramer, the new Dean of Stanford Law School, shares this 
passion. He has devoted roughly the last decade of his career, with two 
lengthy law review articles3 and a half a dozen shorter pieces, to these 
questions. In these works, he has consistently advanced a two-pronged 
argument against judicial review and judicial supremacy. First, Kramer 
has claimed that while the Founders explicitly sanctioned judicial 
review of state constitutions and laws, they never intended courts to 
judge the constitutionality of federal legislation. Given the novelty and 
relative obscurity of judicial review in 1789, the Founders would never 
have authorized judicial review of federal statutes. Second, Kramer 
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A. 1990, Stanford; J.D. 1993, 
Yale.-Ed. 
** Professor of Law, University of California (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American 
Enterprise Institute. A.B. 1989, Harvard; J.D. 1992, Yale. - Ed. Thanks to John McGinnis 
and Larry Alexander for helpful conversations. 
1. In the interest of clarity, we use "judicial review" rather narrowly, as only 
encompassing the power of judges to decide the meaning of a constitution in the course of 
hearing a case. Hence, when a litigant claims that some statute violates the federal 
Constitution, the judge may decide for herself whether the statute actually does violate the 
Constitution. Given our narrow meaning of judicial review, nothing need follow from the 
judiciary's reading of the Constitution. In particular, our definition says nothing about what, 
if anything, other people must do either with the judiciary's constitutional interpretations or 
with the resulting judgments. 
2 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
3. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 
Term - Foreword: We the Court, 115  HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer, 
We the Court]. 
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has insisted that rather than crowning the judiciary supreme in 
constitutional interpretation, the Constitution actually took for 
granted that the people were the final arbiters of the Constitution's 
meaning and that they would influence and discipline the federal 
branches through voting, petitioning, and mobbing. 
Kramer has pulled these arguments together, and in some places 
has extended them, in The People Themselves. His criticisms of the 
foundations of judicial review remain, but in more muted form. 
Whereas Kramer has, in the past, adamantly insisted that the 
Constitution's original understanding does not authorize judicial 
review, here he makes such comments much less frequently and only 
in passing, so much so that some readers may erroneously conclude 
that he has abandoned his earlier position. In toning down his claim, 
Kramer seems to have learned two lessons: first, that the argument 
against judicial review is a losing one (as we have argued, the 
Constitution's text contains numerous indications of judicial review's 
constitutionality and dozens of founders understood the Constitution 
to permit courts to review the constitutionality of federal statutes); 
and second, that the argument against judicial supremacy need not 
(and should not) rest on a futile assault on judicial review. 
The other elements of Kramer's argument - the rejection of 
judicial supremacy and the celebration of popular constitutionalism -
remain pretty much as they were before. Though the arguments may 
be couched slightly differently and though Kramer exhumes more of 
the historical record, we do not believe that he has fundamentally 
altered his claims. For Kramer, the people themselves - not the 
courts - should decide the Constitution's meaning through the 
process of voting, petitioning, and mobbing. 
We should disclose up front that we have criticized the various 
incarnations of Kramer's attacks on judicial review.4 As noted, we 
believe that the Constitution, properly understood, authorizes federal 
courts to judge the constitutionality of federal legislation. Even though 
the Constitution does not explicitly grant state courts the same power, 
such authority was unnecessary when the Constitution was enacted.5 
4. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 887 (2003) (hereinafter Prakash & Yoo, Origins]; Saikrishna B. Prakash & John 
C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
1459 (2001); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, Questions for the Critics of Judicial 
Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 (2003) [hereinafter Prakash & Yoo, Questions]; John C. 
Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997). 
5. The Court has stated: 
We begin with the axiom that, under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty 
concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the 
Supremacy Clause. Under this system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that 
state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate 
claims arising under the laws of the United States. 
Tafflin v. Levin, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1989). 
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Given background presumptions, because the Constitution never 
forbade state court review of the constitutionality of federal 
legislation, the state courts could engage in such review. 
We share Kramer's view that the Constitution does not crown any 
branch supreme in the interpretation of the Constitution although we 
reach that conclusion based on the Constitution itself, not on 
exogenous theories of politics. We believe that each branch, in the 
course of exercising its powers, has an equal responsibility to interpret 
the Constitution and to act consistent with their own reading of it. 
Judicial review is merely the means by which federal judges 
implement the Constitution's higher authority in the course of 
deciding cases or controversies. 
Nonetheless, we think that Kramer's arguments, even after his 
refinements and revisions, suffer from some significant flaws. To begin 
with, his book, like his previous works, never adequately defines what 
he means either by "judicial supremacy" or by "popular 
constitutionalism." One has some general sense, but Kramer never 
precisely spells out what he favors and what he opposes. Second, by 
focusing exclusively on history, Kramer misses the significant textual 
and structural arguments against the notion that the rest of 
government must obey the judiciary's constitutional interpretations. 
By granting the "judicial power" to the federal courts, the 
Constitution gives the judiciary the authority to decide certain cases 
and controversies. The courts decide cases by issuing a final judgment. 
Once issued, the final judgment decides the case once and for all. 
Because the courts have the judicial power'and jurisdiction over cases 
arising under the Constitution, when they issue final judgments in 
cases that involve constitutional interpretation, other branches must 
obey and enforce such judgments. 
On the other hand, the judiciary's exercise of judicial power over 
cases arising under the Constitution does not suggest that the other 
branches (or anyone else for that matter) must embrace the 
constitutional interpretations that underlay any particular judgment. 
A judicial opinion does not command the same authority as a 
judgment and has no more authoritativeness, so far as the Constitution 
is concerned, than anyone else's opinion.6 Other branches can choose 
to look to judicial opinions in hopes of finding some judicial wisdom 
6. Others have made a similar distinction between a judicial judgment and an opinion. 
See John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the 
Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371 (1988); Gary Lawson & Christopher Moore, The 
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Edward A. 
Hartnett, A Matter of Judgement, not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123 (1999). 
One noted departmentalist has rejected such a distinction. See Michael Stokes Paulsen. The 
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). 
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and to predict how future judges may decide a similar case, but they 
need not adopt the reasoning of judges. 
Put another way, courts enjoy judgment supremacy - the other 
branches must enforce the judgments that resolve Article III cases or 
controversies. For the purpose of finally resolving a case, the judiciary 
decides who wins and loses, once and for all, even if everyone (save 
the prevailing party) thinks the courts have gotten it egregiously 
wrong. Courts lack interpretive supremacy - the power to resolve, 
once and for all, the Constitution's meaning. The Constitution 
nowhere requires that the other branches embrace the judiciary's 
constitutional readings. This was the argument Abraham Lincoln 
made in response to Dred Scott,7 and we think Lincoln generally had it 
right.8 Even though the political branches must enforce the judiciary's 
judgments, absolutely no one need obey the judiciary's readings 
of the Constitution. 
What about the people themselves? Though "We the People" 
established the Constitution and may amend it, the people themselves 
are not the arbiters of the Constitution's meaning. The Constitution 
does not establish a People's Court or a People's Committee by which 
the people definitively decide the Constitution's meaning. Moreover, 
we have never decided cases by reference to who won at the ballot box 
or by which side had the biggest, most violent mob.9 
None of this denies the significant role that the people can play in 
constitutional interpretation. Individuals can voice their own readings 
of the Constitution. They can take actions, such as voting, petitioning, 
and assembling, which can:' shape what government actors believe and 
say about the Constitution. They can elect state and federal legislators 
who can trigger the process for amending the Constitution. They can 
elect a President and Senate who can use the appointments process to 
7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
8. Lincoln explained: 
I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitutional questions are to be decided 
by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case, upon 
the parties to a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high 
respect and consideration, in all parallel cases by all other departments of the government. 
And while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any case, still the 
evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be 
overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the 
evils of a different practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if a policy 
of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed 
by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between 
parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers, having, to that 
extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal. 
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECfED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
9. Some scholars argue national elections do occasionally function as quasi­
constitutional amendments. For the theory of "constitutional moments," see BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993). 
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change the composition of the federal courts and hence their direction. 
Yet there is no formal mechanism by which the people themselves can 
directly establish or fix the Constitution's meaning. While the people 
can be moved to take great actions in extraordinary situations, they 
are usually bystanders in the Constitution's day-to-day interpretation. 
The people themselves lack the time or the inclination to sit in review 
of every constitutional interpretation and somehow set it right. 
Below, we first consider Kramer's arguments in favor of popular 
constitutionalism and against judicial supremacy. As noted, we regard 
them as lacking sufficient rigor, making it unclear what he favors and 
opposes. Then we advance the argument in favor of judgment 
supremacy and against interpretive supremacy. 
I .  
At the core of Kramer's book is a seemingly simple and "popular" 
proposition: the people themselves should decide the Constitution's 
meaning.10 Surprisingly though, Kramer never makes clear what this 
means. Does Kramer suppose that the people will routinely and finally 
decide constitutional questions? Or does he instead mean that, in 
extraordinary situations, the people will insist upon their preferred 
reading of the Constitution? Most of the time Kramer writes as if he 
favors the former, more active, popular role.11 Other times he seems to 
conclude that a more passive, rare popular constitutionalism is the 
best we can hope for from the busy, distracted, and typically divided 
people.12 Kramer's discussion of popular constitutionalism is also 
muddled because by the end of his book, he seems to treat it 
synonymously with departmentalism - the idea that each coordinate 
10. P. 227 ("Americans in the past always came to the same conclusion: that it was their 
right, and their responsibility, as republican citizens to say finally what the Constitution 
means. The question is, would Americans today do the same? Are we still prepared to insist 
on our prerogative to control the meaning of our Constitution?"). 
11. For example, Kramer states: 
Neither the Founding generation nor their children nor their children's children, right on 
down to our grandparents' generation, were so passive about their role as republican 
citizens. They would not accept - did not accept - being told that a lawyerly elite had 
charge of the Constitution, and they would have been incredulous if told (as we are often 
told today) that the main reason to worry about who becomes president is that the winner 
will control judicial appointments. 
P. 228. 
12. Kramer offers several options that do not directly involve American citizens at all. 
The Constitution leaves room for countless political responses to an overly assertive Court: 
Justices can be impeached, the Court's budget can be slashed, the President can ignore its 
mandates. Congress can strip it of jurisdiction or shrink its size or pack it with new members 
or give it burdensome new responsibilities or revise its procedures. 
P. 249. 
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branch of government must independently interpret the Constitution 
in the course of performing its own functions.13 Departmentalism, 
however, has no necessary relationship with popular constitutionalism. 
A. What Is Popular Constitutionalism? 
How should the people themselves decide the Constitution's 
· meaning? Throughout most of his book, Kramer contends that the 
people will establish the Constitution's meaning by voting, petitioning, 
and, if need be, mobbing. Consistent with this view, Kramer celebrates 
episodes in English and American history where he claims the people 
insisted upon their understanding of fundamental law. In these 
episodes, the people themselves supposedly decided the meaning of 
fundamental law and judges had little or no role to play. Moreover, 
most of his book suggests that popular constitutionalism yields a 
viable, regular means of establishing a popular meaning. After all, 
Kramer's popular constitutionalism is meant to be a substitute for 
judicial supremacy, a mechanism that, whatever its faults, does 
regularly generate constitutional meaning. 
At the end of his book, however, Kramer bows to reality, writing 
as if popular constitutionalism is possible in only those rare moments 
where the people become sufficiently angered or outraged.14 Here 
Kramer admits that we cannot expect the people themselves to 
establish the Constitution's meaning on a recurring, continuous basis. 
Hence, the choice at the end of the book is not between judicial 
supremacy and voting, petitioning, and mobbing. Rather, Kramer 
frames the choice as being between judicial supremacy and 
departmentalism.15 Given Kramer's persistent praise for popular 
constitutionalism, one supposes that he somehow believes popular 
constitutionalism and departmentalism are one and the same. 
Yet Kramer's popular constitutionalism has no logical connection 
to departmentalism. Kramer's popular constitutionalism is a theory 
about the external relationship between the federal government and 
the polity; the people decide the Constitution's meaning for all three 
branches. Departmentalism is a theory about the internal relationship 
between the three branches of the federal government in interpreting 
13. P. 252 ("It does not follow that nothing is at stake in the choice between a system of 
judicial supremacy and one based on departmental or coordinate construction."). 
14. He explains that: 
It takes a lot to persuade a majority in this country that particular rulings are wrong enough 
to overcome this presumption [of correctness]. . . .  The upshot is that the court's conduct 
must be quite provocative and very unpopular, usually over a sustained period, before it will 
produce actual legislative or executive countermeasure. 
P. 252. 
15. See supra note 13. 
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the Constitution. Departmentalism, whatever its merits, cannot have 
grand populist pretensions, for it says absolutely nothing about the 
people's constitutional role. Departmentalism is more like "republican 
constitutionalism" than "popular constitutionalism." 
To the extent Kramer makes an argument in favor of popular 
constitutionalism, he seems to claim that agency "slack" exists in the 
people's delegation of the power to interpret the Constitution: 
legislative, executive, and judicial officials may interpret the 
Constitution at odds with the people's preferences, were the people to 
undertake the task themselves. Indeed, during the ratification debates, 
many conceived of the relationship between the people and their 
elected representatives as one between a principal and its agents.16 But 
in focusing on agency slack, Kramer wholly ignores the benefits of 
delegation. The American people are not obsessed with the 
Constitution and its meaning. They clearly have higher priorities that 
occupy their time and energies (unbelievable as that might seem to 
constitutional law professors). Only when their agents interpret the 
Constitution outside the range of acceptable results will the people 
even consider taking popular action. 
We see much wisdom in a departmentalist system where popular 
constitutionalism plays a role in extreme cases. Had Kramer described 
and defended it, there would be much worthy of praise. But Kramer 
never reconciles his powerful devotion to popular constitutionalism 
as a ready, effective means of establishing constitutional meaning 
with his eleventh-hour admission that the people cannot be counted 
upon to continuously and effectively challenge governmental 
interpretations. Nor does he discuss why he seems to believe that 
popular constitutionalism and departmentalism are identical. By the 
end of the book, though one is certain that Kramer favors popular 
constitutionalism, one has little idea what he means by it.17 
B. Is the Original Version of Popular Constitutionalism a Viable 
Means of Establishing the Constitution's Meaning? 
Kramer's original version of popular constitutionalism has an 
emphatically populist ring to it. He writes as if the "street" will decide 
what the Constitution means. We the People - the Constitution's 
16. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
17. One could imagine a genuine, robust, popular constitutionalism: a plebiscitary 
system where constitutional questions are consistently and routinely put to the people. 
Because innumerable constitutional questions could arise, there would have to be some 
sorting mechanism to limit the issues that would be put to the people. Kramer never 
discusses such a system where the people could routinely and continuously decide the 
Constitution's meaning, probably because such a plebiscitary system has no basis in the 
federal Constitution. 
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makers - would never allow anyone else to tell us what the 
Constitution means. None of the popular actions Kramer lauds, 
however, enables the people to regularly establish the Constitution's 
meaning. Voting, petitioning, and mobbing permit people to express 
their general preferences, but they do not enable the people to clearly 
express the fine distinctions often necessary in constitutional law. 
Consider elections. As meaningful as elections are, we can never 
expect that they regularly will settle disputed questions of 
constitutional meaning.18 To begin with, popular voting is episodic. 
The election of federal officials every two, four, or six years cannot 
establish the meaning of complex constitutional provisions, such as the 
First and Second Amendments, for the votes are too infrequent to 
serve as a proxy on hundreds of contested constitutional law issues. 
Moreover, virtually all people cast their votes with nonconstitutional 
considerations in mind.19 There are two reasons why nonconstitutional 
considerations regularly might take precedence. First, current voters 
might favor their own policy preferences over the preferences 
embodied in the Constitution. Second, even when constitutional 
meaning plays some role in a voter's choice, nonconstitutional 
considerations might still regularly trump, depending on the intensity 
of her preferences on the issues. A voter may favor a candidate 
because of his positions on taxes or the environment even if she 
disagrees with the candidate's views about the constitutionality of 
abortion or affirmative action. Finally, even the rare single-issue voter 
whose only criterion is fidelity to the Constitution faces a dilemma in 
expressing her preferences in a single vote. Few candidates will ever 
completely mirror a voter's constitutional preferences. Almost always, 
a voter will prefer Candidate A on some issues of constitutional 
interpretation, but prefer Candidate B on others. Election of a 
candidate may tell us about voters' preferences for the amalgamation 
of constitutional views held by that candidate, but they do not tell us 
much about voter preferences on the discrete constitutional issues 
in that bundle. For all these reasons, episodic voting for candidates is 
18. Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments suffers from similar problems. 
See ACKERMAN, supra note 9. For a critique of the use of popular elections to establish 
constitutional meanings in the absence of changes to the text, see John C. Yoo, Laws as 
Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
757, 779-88 (2001). 
19. Exit polls taken during the 2004 presidential election revealed that moral values, the 
economy and jobs, terrorism, and the war in Iraq were most salient to voters. Also 
registering were: health care, taxes, and education. Proper interpretation of the Constitution, 
or even the more generous category of Supreme Court nominations, did not register highly. 
See Katharine Q. Seelye, Moral Values Cited as a Defining Issue of the Election, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2004, at 4. 
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an inexact means of determining the people's views about 
constitutional meaning.20 
In theory, petitioning and mobbing do not present the same 
difficulties as voting. Were they so inclined, the people themselves 
could petition and/or mob to oppose or defend every official 
constitutional interpretation. Yet, several circumstances conspire to 
make such popular "interpretation" unlikely and ambiguous -
meaning that it typically will be impossible to discern a "popular" 
meaning for any given constitutional provision. First, we suspect that 
fewer individuals petition and mob as compared to those who vote. 
While many people believe voting is a civic duty, far fewer probably 
share this sense about petitioning and mobbing. Second, most 
questions of constitutional meaning do not arouse any level of popular 
emotion sufficient to trigger mobbing or petitioning. There are many 
more mundane constitutional matters than the hot button issues of 
abortion, privacy, and affirmative action. All this suggests that, for the 
vast majority of constitutional questions, the people will not take to 
the streets. 
Even where some issue moves a large number of people on an 
issue that involves the Constitution, the meaning of popular action will 
be indeterminate. Suppose one million people conduct a mass protest 
and letter writing campaign against the death penalty. Does it follow 
that they have established a popular meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment prohibition? How do we 
construe the silence of the millions who might agree with the 
judiciary's conclusions about the constitutionality of the death penalty, 
and so choose to do nothing? Or suppose pro-life groups succeed in 
gathering protest marches that dwarf the size of pro-choice rallies. 
Does this mean that the pro-life group "wins" the interpretational 
question? Even if we agreed that the overwhelming majority of the 
people agreed with a reading of the Constitution, the precise meaning 
would be indeterminate without a text. For instance, we know pro­
choice rallies support Roe v. Wade,21 but are rally goers uniformly 
against parental notification and in favor of permitting late-term 
abortions? We can guess, but these and other meanings are hardly 
obvious. Given the obvious difficulties with discerning a popular 
20. In contrast, because they "vote" much more often, members of the three branches of 
government face few impediments to acting upon their understanding of the Constitution. 
Judges may issue judgments precisely on a statute's constitutionality; when presented with 
legislation, executives may (indeed must) judge the constitutionality and the wisdom of it; 
and legislators, since they vote on each bill, are afforded a ready opportunity to gauge that 
bill's constitutionality. While each of these officials may choose to ignore questions about 
the constitutionality of government action, they at least have a much easier time of 
interpreting the Constitution. The people are not so fortunate. 
21 .  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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constitutional interpretation and given that Kramer never presents a 
theory explaining why a mob or petition should be considered proxy 
for the people as a whole, we do not know why Kramer places such 
stock in voting, petitioning, and mobbing. 
If all this is true, what of Kramer's claim that many founding-era 
politicians cited the people as the Constitution's ultimate guardians? 
Were people more virtuous, civic-minded, and politically active in the 
good old days? We agree that many founders who cited the 
availability of judicial review as a means of checking Congress also 
emphasized the role the people might play if Congress violated the 
Constitution. While some of this was perhaps sincere, much of it was 
an attempt to respond to claims that the Constitution granted too 
much power to the federal government. After citing the Constitution's 
structural protections, such as bicameralism, the presidential veto, and 
judicial review, the Constitution's supporters cited the people as the 
Constitution's ultimate defenders. 
Yet few Federalists seriously could have expected that the people 
would consistently serve as dependable, regular, and faithful guardians 
of the Constitution. After all, the people themselves had pressed state 
legislators to violate the state constitutions, so much so that the 
judiciaries came to be seen as necessary bulwarks of limited 
government and of minority rights.22 Moreover, as James Iredell wrote 
at the time, the people would suffer quite a few constitutional 
violations before they could be expected to rise up.23 People have 
neither the time nor the inclination to examine the wisdom and 
constitutionality of every governmental action. It is not that 
government officials are superior diviners of the Constitution's 
meaning; it is that the people, after they toil, pray, and spend time with 
their families, have precious little time to serve as the ever-watchful 
guardians of the Constitution. 
C. The Perils of Popular Constitutionalism 
Though Kramer never systematically considers the potential 
drawbacks of popular constitutionalism, he does admit that it suffers a 
few weaknesses. In his Epilogue, he writes that it "takes a lot to 
persuade a majority in this country that particular rulings are wrong 
enough to overcome" the modern-day presumption that the judiciary 
has properly construed the Constitution (p. 252). Kramer also admits 
22 See ]ACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 49-50 (1996). 
23. As Iredell explained, "We well know how difficult it is to excite the resistance of a 
whole people. . . . A thousand injuries may be suffered, and many hundreds ruined, 
before this can be brought about." AN ELECTOR, To THE PUBLIC, IN 2 LIFE 
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 145, 147 (Griffith J. McRee ed., Peter Smith 
1949) (1857). 
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that "[t]he upshot is that the Court's conduct must be quite 
provocative and very unpopular, usually over a sustained period, 
before it will produce actual legislative or executive countermeasures" 
(p. 252). These concessions rob popular constitutionalism of much of 
its attractiveness. 
But popular constitutionalism has many other difficulties. First, 
there may be reason to doubt whether the people are sufficiently 
familiar with the Constitution to discern its meaning (even assuming 
that we have agreed upon some way of establishing its meaning). 
Second, it seems likely that many people pay less attention to 
interpreting the Constitution and more to their policy preferences. 
Third, Kramer is never clear what the Constitution actually represents. 
Is it merely the preferences of the current majority for certain rules of 
self-government, in which case it should be easy for the people to 
change them? Or does the Constitution establish enduring rules set 
out by previous generations that are intended to be difficult to 
change? Although Kramer often refers to the people's ability to settle 
the Constitution's meaning, at times his ardor for popular 
constitutionalism seems to stem frcm the notion that popular 
interpretation of the Constitution allows the people to alter it.24 
The questions that necessarily arise from Kramer's academic 
project are intricate and difficult. We do not pretend to know the 
answer to all these questions. But some discussion of each of 
them (and many others) would have been appropriate in a 
book extolling the people themselves as final constitutional 
interpreters. Unfortunately, Kramer's book is short on the specifics of 
popular constitutionalism. 
Once again, we are not opposed to the idea that the Constitution 
contemplates an extraconstitutional check on the branches of the 
federal government. But we see many problems with the idea of the 
people as the constant and final interpreters of the Constitution. And 
as we discuss in the next parts of this essay, whether the people 
interpret the Constitution or not does not meaningfully bear 
on how the federal government itself allocates the function of 
constitutional interpretation. 
II. 
The second core feature of The People Themselves is its criticism of 
judicial supremacy. Kramer, however, never identifies his precise 
24. This is certainly the worry in removing the power of interpretation from the 
.iudiciarv's hands. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) ("Shifting legislative 
majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed 
amendment process contained in Article V."). 
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target. Does Kramer merely oppose interpretive supremacy - the 
view that the courts are the final arbiters of the Constitution's 
meaning, such that the rest of society (including the political branches) 
must embrace its understandings? Or does he also oppose the more 
limited notion of judgment supremacy - that even if the courts are 
not supreme in their constitutional expositions, the other branches 
must nonetheless enforce their judgments? The People Themselves 
seems oblivious to the many scholars who have wrestled with these 
issues before; discussion of their arguments would have made these 
questions clear. Here, we define judicial supremacy - something 
Kramer does not do - and criticize his arguments against it. 
A. What Is Judicial Supremacy? 
"Judicial Supremacy" is a well-worn phrase that bears several 
meanings. One is that the judiciary determines the Constitution's 
meaning such that the entire nation must accept the judiciary's reading 
of the Constitution. This seems to be the judicial supremacy that finds 
voice in Cooper v. Aaron.25 Once the Supreme Court concluded that 
the Constitution prohibited segregated schools, all federal and state 
officials had to take measures to end segregation in schools or 
otherwise violate their oath to the Constitution. Under this extreme 
version of judicial supremacy, it is not only emphatically the judiciary's 
duty to say what the Constitution means, but it is also the exclusive 
right of the judiciary to say what the Constitution means.26 We call this 
view "interpretive supremacy." 
Another form of judicial supremacy is "judgment supremacy," 
where the only thing that is supreme is the judiciary's judgments. On 
this view, the executive branch and Congress need not adopt the 
judiciary's conclusions about the Constitution's meaning. The political 
branches are free to articulate, advocate, and act upon alternative 
constitutional understandings. The only thing the political branches 
cannot do is ignore or thwart the final judgments issued by courts. 
Hence, members of Congress may pass legislation contrary to the 
judiciary's constitutional interpretations so long as they do not impede 
or overturn a particular judgment. Likewise, the President may 
vigorously and publicly disagree with the Supreme Court's 
25. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). As the Court explains: 
It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in 
the Brown case is the supreme law of the land. and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of 
binding effect on the States any[t]hing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137. 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). 
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interpretation of some constitutional provision so long as she 
continues to execute the judiciary's judgments. 
An important but rarely discussed exception to judgment 
supremacy helps prove the rule. The pardon power grants the 
President the power to nullify judgments against those convicted of 
committing offenses against the United States.27 One could argue that 
the Constitution recognizes only this one exception to the federal 
courts' final say over cases, implying that neither the President nor 
Congress enjoy the ability to ignore judgments in any other area. 
While Kramer obviously opposes interpretive supremacy for the 
judiciary, he never clearly states his position on judgment supremacy. 
He says little about what the political branches must do when faced 
with a judgment based on reasoning they reject. This is odd because he 
is clearly aware of the distinction. Indeed, he cites James Madison 
as opposing judgment supremacy because Madison apparently 
believed that judgment supremacy (being the last in time to decide 
a constitutional question) practically guaranteed interpretive 
supremacy (p. 252). 
At times, Kramer hints that his rejection of judicial supremacy 
encompasses both interpretive and judgment supremacy. For instance, 
Kramer states that under the departmentalist theory, the judiciary's 
decisions only have force if the other branches adopt them.28 Even 
though there is an ambiguity in this claim (because one does not know 
if Kramer is referring to the opinion, the judgment, or both), this 
discussion seems to suggest that Kramer opposes both interpretive and 
judgment supremacy. Another time, however, Kramer uses "judicial 
supremacy" in a way that suggests that he does not mean for it to refer 
to judgment supremacy. Discussing Lincoln, Kramer claims that 
Lincoln opposed judicial supremacy.29 Yet as we have noted, Lincoln 
generally believed he had to enforce judgments. Kramer's treatment 
of Lincoln suggests that whenever Kramer refers to judicial 
supremacy, he only means interpretive supremacy and not judgment 
supremacy. After reading his book, we could not discern Kramer's 
position on judgment supremacy. 
27. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 1. 
28. P. 252 (contrasting judicial supremacy with departmentalism and suggesting that 
only under the latter theory does the authority of judicial decisions depend upon the 
reactions of other branches); see also p. 235. 
29. P. 212 (describing Lincoln's efforts to recognize black citizenship in a number 
of contexts). 
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B. Kramer's Surprisingly Weak Case Against Judicial Supremacy 
Regardless of the version of judicial supremacy under 
consideration, it is certainly the regnant ideology in the modern 
academy. Kramer clearly recognizes that popular constitutionalism, 
whatever its historical support, enjoys little to no popular or scholarly 
backing.3° Knowing this, Kramer ought to systematically have 
explained the benefits and drawbacks of each, with an eye to 
explaining why popular constitutionalism is functionally superior to 
judicial supremacy. 
Yet Kramer never does this. He takes a few stabs against judicial 
supremacy, arguing against the notion that it is necessary to avoid 
conflicts about the meaning of the law and against the notion that 
courts offer a superior means of protecting the Constitution's 
fundamental commitments. He makes no similar effort to explore the 
comparative costs and benefits of popular constitutionalism. 
Rather than mounting a comprehensive attack on judicial 
supremacy, Kramer's book compiles vast amounts of history to show 
that, from time to time, members of the political branches and/or the 
public have opposed judicial supremacy. While his historical claims 
are interesting, he never explains why we should care about this 
history. Is it because the original understanding of the Constitution 
binds us today?31 Is it because history is the product of a tradition that 
should be followed as precedent in a system of common law 
constitutionalism? Is history simply the record of previous decisions 
that should be followed only when appropriate? Rather than make 
any of these claims, Kramer's argument appears to be that since many 
people have opposed judicial supremacy in the past and since many of 
them claimed that the people were the Constitution's ultimate 
guardians, this is how we ought to read the Constitution today. 
Of course, such arguments will not convince supporters of judicial 
supremacy to embrace popular constitutionalism. Those who favor 
judicial supremacy usually see wisdom in having one institution decide 
the Constitution's final meaning.32 Having an ultimate arbiter of the 
Constitution's meaning serves the values of finality and stability in the 
law. While supporters of judicial supremacy might conceivably favor 
legislative supremacy or executive supremacy, they will not abandon 
30. P. 8 ("Many, perhaps most, scholars today believe that 'popular sovereignty' is and 
can be expressed only at rare moments, that 'the people' are otherwise either absent or 
present only as an abstraction."). 
31 .  In his earlier work Kramer expressly denies that we ought to embrace popular 
constitutionalism (and thereby reject judicial supremacy) merely because the Founders 
made this choice. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 3, at 14. 
32 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 1 10 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1387 (1997) (defending judicial supremacy). 
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judicial supremacy for a system long on populist rhetoric and short on 
specifics. 
Others support judicial supremacy because they clearly prefer the 
judiciary's constitutional readings in certain substantive areas over the 
readings that would prevail in the absence of judicial supremacy. Had 
their preferences prevailed through the regular majoritarian process, 
they likely would not have supported judicial supremacy in the first 
place. Hence the last thing these folks would want is a system of 
constitutional interpretation by majority vote. 
Despite having read Kramer's books and articles, we have only a 
vague sense of what popular constitutionalism is and why Kramer 
favors it. We also have an inadequate sense of what Kramer means by 
judicial supremacy and why Kramer opposes it. We think these 
difficulties stem from Kramer's preoccupation with history. As 
originalists, we love history; but even we see the wisdom of a little 
more precision and analysis of that history, including an explanation 
for why history matters. In the end, The People Themselves reads 
more like a two-century long story than an argument for a greater 
popular role in constitutional interpretation. 
III. 
While we are critical of Kramer's claims, we could hardly blame 
him for attempting to resolve the central question that has fascinated 
many constitutional law scholars. A number of leading scholars 
recently have questioned the legitimacy, usefulness, or existence of 
judicial review, including Michael Klarman,33 Richard Posner,34 Mark 
Tushnet,35 Adrian Vermeule,36 and Jeremy Waldron.37 A broader 
group of authors, including Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer,38 
Neal Devins and Louis Fisher,39 Sanford Levinson,40 Michael 
McConnell,41 Robert Nagel,42 and Michael Stokes Paulsen,43 among 
33. Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 
145 (1998). 
34. RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 15-27 (2001 ). 
35. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
36. Adrian Vermeule, Judicial Review and Institutional Choice, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1557 (2001). 
37. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). 
38. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 32. 
39. Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 83 (1998). 
40. Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071 (1987). 
41. Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 1 1 1  HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997). 
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others, has been debating whether the federal judiciary enjoys 
interpretive supremacy. Along with Kramer's book, much of this 
discussion seems to have been precipitated by the Rehnquist Court's 
federalism decisions and by its declaration in City of Boerne v. Flores44 
that its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment binds Congress. 
We have yet to see whether academics display the same level of 
concern about judicial supremacy in the wake of the Supreme Court's 
unprecedented declaration of authority to review the legal status of 
enemy prisoners captured in wartime.4s Nonetheless, these articles 
draw on a deeper trend of skepticism toward judicial review inspired 
by Cooper v. Aaron46 and the decisions of the Warren Court in the 
1960s, or by the decisions of the Four Horsemen in the New Deal 
period. In this respect, these authors are tackling the same problems 
that were central to the work of Jesse Choper,47 John Hart Ely,48 
Learned Hand,49 and Herbert Wechsler.so 
It would be unfair to criticize Kramer without at least sketching 
out our own views on the subject. After all, to quote our teacher Akhil 
Amar, it takes a theory to beat a theory.s1 In our prior work, we 
argued that the Constitution contemplates and authorizes judicial 
review.s2 The Constitution assumes that each branch will interpret the 
Constitution and act in a manner consistent with it. The judiciary is 
not excepted from that fundamental obligation. When a judge hears a 
case involving a conflict between some statute and the Constitution, 
the judge must favor the Constitution. 
Here we argue in favor of judgment supremacy, but against 
interpretive supremacy. We propose that the only obligation the other 
branches have to judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution is to 
enforce the judgment in that individual case. They have no obligation 
42. Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Supremacy and the Settlement Function, 39 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 849 (1998). 
43. Paulsen, supra note 6. 
44. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) . 
45. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Harndi v. Rurnsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) .  
46. 358 U.S .  1 (1958). 
47. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 
(1980). 
48. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
49. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958). 
50. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CO LUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
51. See also Richard A. Epstein. Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Reioinder to 
Professors Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435, 1435 (1983) ("Nonetheless it takes a 
theory to beat a theory . . . .  "). 
52. See, e.g., Prakash & Yoo, Origins, supra note 4; Prakash & Yoo, Questions, supra 
note 3. 
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to adopt and implement the constitutional interpretations that form 
the basis of those judgments. This was the position President Abraham 
Lincoln took toward Dred Scott. 53 We also discuss how the political 
branches should respond to judicial efforts to secure interpretive 
supremacy for judicial decisions. 
Before beginning, we should make our aims and methodology 
clear. Our aims are positive and not normative. Here, we only address 
what the Constitution originally meant. Nonetheless, though our 
argument is a positive one, we believe that our rendition of the 
Constitution's implicit interpretational rules is normatively attractive. 
Our methodology in discerning the Constitution's meaning is 
originalist: we merely try to establish what the Constitution meant 
when it was ratified. We do not think that political developments 
subsequent to the Constitution's ratification should control this 
reading, although they do provide data on how certain systems have 
worked out in practice. 
We start off with what we hope is common ground: that the 
Constitution permits, indeed requires, each branch of government to 
interpret the Constitution. Some, such as Kramer, have argued that 
the Constitution does not expressly authorize judicial review and that 
the other branches somehow have a greater claim to interpret the 
Constitution. This gets things exactly backward. From the beginning, 
the judiciary's power to interpret the Constitution has been on firm 
ground and it was sometimes (but incorrectly) claimed that the other 
branches have no place in interpreting the Constitution. The judicial 
power to hear cases arising under the Constitution was understood to 
be the authority to decide the meaning of the Constitution in such 
cases. This is one aspect of the Constitution's supremacy as higher law 
superior to a statute. If a case presents a conflict between a 
constitutional provision and a statute, a federal court exercises judicial 
review in choosing the proper rule of decision. 
Several constitutional provisions confirm this intuition. Article VI 
requires that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land . . .  any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."54 Again, in order 
to decide whether a state law conflicts with a federal constitutional 
provision, federal courts would have to interpret the federal 
constitution first. The Supremacy Clause also makes clear that the 
Constitution itself is law to be enforced in court, rather than a vague 
53. See supra note 8. 
54. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
1556 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1539 
set of political-legal principles outside of judicial cognizance. Both 
Article III and Article VI include the Constitution as a source of law 
the courts will enforce in performing their unique constitutional duty 
to decide cases or controversies. 
While the other branches lack such specific interpretational 
authority, they too must interpret the Constitution. After all, members 
of each branch take an oath to the Constitution, which means, at a 
minimum, that they must discern the meaning of the Constitution they 
are pledged to uphold.55 What makes them different is the form that 
their review takes. The President, for example, has the duty to 
"preserve, protect and defend the Constitution."56 To defend the 
Constitution, the President presumably must have some idea of what it 
means. Moreover, to exercise his own constitutional powers properly, 
the President must interpret them first. To take but one example, the 
President must give meaning to different constitutional provisions 
when deciding whether to veto a law that might be unconstitutional. 
This is not judicial review because it does not arise in the course of 
deciding a case or controversy. Nevertheless, this presidential review 
occurs · through the President's performance of his unique 
constitutional responsibilities. 
A similar analysis applies to Congress. Per the oaths clause, 
congressmen must support the Constitution. Consistent with their duty 
to support the Constitution, congressmen cannot enact laws that are 
unconstitutional. Individual members of Congress, therefore, have the 
independent duty to review the constitutionality of proposed 
legislation before them and to oppose unconstitutional laws. The same 
principle is true for state executive, legislative, and judicial officials: 
each must interpret the Constitution in the course of performing their 
own constitutional responsibilities. 
Given all this, judicial review is not unique. It is merely the means 
by which the federal judges obey the Constitution while executing 
their constitutional function of deciding cases or controversies. Other 
branches of the government have the same obligation, but different 
functions that give it expression. As President Andrew Jackson 
observed when vetoing legislation rechartering the Bank of the United 
States: 
55. We understand that a constitution might enshrine one institution as the final arbiter 
of a constitution's meaning, in which case all others must adhere to that institution's readings 
of the constitution. But even if a constitution contained such a provision, one would still 
have to interpret the constitution to see if it contained the interpretive supremacy provision 
described above. Some level of independent interpretation is simply unavoidable. We, of 
course, do not believe that the federal Constitution contains any provision relating to 
interpretive supremacy. 
56. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 8. 
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It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, 
and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or 
resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval as it 
is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for judicial 
decision.57 
Judicial review is just a subset of a more general category of 
constitutional review. 
Where are the people in this structure? Obviously, the people are 
free to interpret the Constitution as they see fit. They need not look to 
the legislative, executive, or judiciary for guidance in discerning the 
Constitution's meaning any more than these branches must look to 
each other. As noted earlier, however, the people are not uniquely 
invested with the power to establish the Constitution's meaning. The 
Constitution does not contemplate that the people will regularly, 
routinely establish its meaning on a government-wide scale to the 
exclusion of other governmental actors. 
To the extent that the founders believed that the people could 
institutionally exercise the power to interpret the Constitution, they 
appear to have thought of it on a smaller, more manageable scale. 
Historians have shown that framing-period thought allowed juries to 
interpret the Constitution when deciding cases.58 No single jury, 
however, can bind another to its constitutional interpretation. Nor can 
it force the government to act positively to carry out its views. Nor can 
its views extend beyond criminal law. Juries can only prevent the 
government from enforcing a certain constitutional meaning through 
an individual criminal prosecution. Other than through juries, the 
Constitution permits popular interpretation of its terms only through 
Article V's amendment process. 
More realistically, the Constitution envisions that the people will 
make their legal views known, in a very rough and imprecise way, 
through the political process. This process is endogenous to the 
Constitution, because it is established by the Constitution itself. The 
electorate can vote for candidates who come closest to mirroring their 
desired constitutional views; presidents can then nominate, and the 
Senate confirm, federal judges who share those views. The people also 
can elect state officials that come close to the people's desired 
constitutional views, and these officials can attempt to use the states' 
place in our political system to influence the actions of the federal 
57. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 576, 582 (James D. Richardson 
ed., Washington, Government Printing Office 1896). 
58. SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO· 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (1990); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill 
of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). 
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government. This is, after all, what Jefferson and Madison attempted 
in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves.59 Kramer is right to point out 
that voting, petitioning, and other forms of mass political activity 
give the people a role in constitutional interpretation. But this role 
is indirect. 
Kramer, however, made two mistakes on this issue. First, he 
believes that since it was possible for the people to influence the 
interpretation of the Constitution, the people must enjoy interpretive 
supremacy to the point of precluding judicial review. But that makes 
no sense, just as the argument that because the people can interpret 
the Constitution through the jury there is no need for judicial review 
does not make sense. Jesse Chopet° and Herbert Wechsler61 made a 
similar mistake in suggesting that judicial review of federalism 
questions was unnecessary because states had a strong hand in the 
composition of the federal govemment.62 The one power does not 
necessarily exclude the other. 
Second, Kramer has confused exogenous and endogenous means 
for interpreting the Constitution. The Constitution's endogenous 
mechanism for popular participation in interpretation is the electoral 
process. An exogenous method originates outside the Constitution 
itself - massive political action, refusal to follow the Constitution (or 
a current interpretation), or opposition to the government - and 
cannot be defined or limited by reference to the Constitution. In 
certain extreme and unusual cases, the people can take such 
exogenous measures, but by doing so, they reject the existing legal 
framework. Hence, the people of the states adopted the Constitution 
by a process that violated the rules for amending the Articles of 
Confederation.63 One can view the Civil War as an attempt by a 
minority of the American people to engage in popular mobilization to 
change (or maintain) a constitutional meaning at odds with that to be 
adopted by the elected branches of government. But because these 
59. The Kentucky Resolves were adopted on November 10, 1798, and November 14, 
1799. See 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 131-35 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner 
eds., 1987). The Virginia Resolves were adopted on Dec. 21, 1798. See id. at 135-36; see also 
Akhil Reed Amar, Kentucky and the Constitution: Lessons from the 1790s for the 1990s, 85 
KY. L.J. 1 (1997). 
60. See CHOPER, supra note 47. 
61. See Wechsler, supra note 50. 
62. Professor Kramer has made this mistake in previous pieces. See Prakash & Yoo, 
Questions, supra note 4, at 355 ("Professor Kramer, like Professors Jesse Choper and 
Herbert Wechsler before him, ignores the constitutional text and structure. Fairly read, the 
Constitution's text and structure establishes judicial review in a number of ways.") (internal 
footnotes omitted). 
63. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (U.S. 1781) ("[N]or shall any alteration at 
any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress 
of the united states, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every. state."). 
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measures are exogenous to the Constitution, they do not, as a formal 
matter, alter the Constitution's separation of powers or its system of 
decentralized constitutional interpretation. 
History suggests that these exogenous efforts to alter the 
Constitution's meaning may not be as durable as the old-fashioned 
path of amending the Constitution. Kramer does not differ much from 
Bruce Ackerman in the view that mass political movements exogenous 
to the Constitution should affect its interpretation.64 Both treat the 
New Deal, with its overwhelming majorities in support of the 
expansion of federal power, the creation of the administrative state, 
and the taming of the Supreme Court, as a legitimate change to the 
interpretation of the Constitution. There is an important difference, 
however, between the New Deal and earlier periods. During 
Reconstruction, for example, the radical Republicans enshrined their 
constitutional understanding in three constitutional amendments that 
significantly altered the relationship between the federal government, 
the states, and citizens. In contrast, the New Deal period experienced 
no constitutional amendments. This may explain why certain elements 
of the New Deal state have undergone criticism and efforts 
at change.65 
Our departmentalist approach to constitutional review by the three 
branches clearly rejects the notion of interpretive supremacy. Courts 
are not supreme in interpreting the Constitution. No branch is. The 
constitutional text and structure merely permit the federal courts a 
power of judicial review in the same way that they should be 
understood to grant the other branches the power of interpreting the 
Constitution while performing their own duties. Indeed, the authority 
of the federal courts, by design, is far weaker than that of the other 
branches. While the judiciary enjoys sufficient independence - due to 
life tenure and irreducible salary - to check the other branches 
without fear of direct reprisal, it has no institutional mechanisms to 
actually enforce its constitutional views. Enforcement of the Supreme 
Court's decisions, as many have noted since the time of Alexander 
Hamilton,66 ultimately depends on the agreement of the other 
branches and the support of the public. 
64. See ACKERMAN, supra note 9. 
65. See, e.g. , United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 596 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
("I am aware of no cases prior to the New Deal that characterized the power flowing from 
the Commerce Clause as sweepingly as does our substantial effects test. My review of the 
case law indicates that the substantial effects test is but an innovation of the 20th century."). 
66. The judiciary has, as Hamilton explained, "no influence over either the sword or the 
purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no 
active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely 
judgment . . . .  " Even to enforce its judgments, he observed, the judiciary "must ultimately 
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At times, the scholarly obsession with judicial review and the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty exaggerates the power of the courts. As 
an institution, the federal courts have relatively few personnel and 
only about $3 billion in annual funds. Sitting at the top of a slow, 
decentralized decisionmaking process, the Supreme Court hears 
roughly eighty cases a year. These limited resources restrict the ability 
of the federal courts to hear cases of all kinds, not just constitutional 
cases. Federal courts depend on private parties to bring constitutional 
issues to them, and they raise numerous procedural barriers - such as 
standing, ripeness, mootness, the political question doctrine, and the 
avoidance doctrine - to the decision of those issues. Because of their 
greater responsibilities and scope for action, the other branches will 
encounter constitutional issues more often and have greater resources 
to reach decisions and enforce them. Not only does Congress enact 
many more laws than the Supreme Court can review, but because 
Congress often delegates rulemaking authority to the agencies, 
administrative regulations produce a large number of laws every year 
that the courts cannot possibly review. 
As departmentalists in the Jeffersonian and Lincoln tradition, we 
accept that each branch may make final decisions within their spheres 
of responsibilities based on their own readings of the Constitution. 
Few doubt that the President may veto a bill that he believes to be 
unconstitutional, refuse to prosecute under a criminal law he believes 
to be unconstitutional, or pardon those previously convicted under a 
law he concludes is unconstitutional. But what happens when the 
branches adopt conflicting interpretations of the Constitution? In the 
academic literature, the focal point for this question has been whether 
the President must enforce Supreme Court decisions with which he 
disagrees. Presidents themselves have held varying views on this 
question. President Eisenhower, for example, enforced Brown v. 
Board of Education67 even though he reportedly was skeptical about 
the decision on the merits.68 President Andrew Jackson famously 
refused to enforce a Marshall Court order stopping the removal of 
Indian tribes from Georgia by exclaiming: "John Marshall has made 
his decision, now let him enforce it. "69 Abraham Lincoln took 
something of a middle view by concluding that he was not bound by 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
68. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 35-36, 157-
59 (2000). 
69. DAVID C. TOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 365 (1948); G. EDW.ARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL 
CHANGE, 1813-35 (1988). 
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the Court's reasoning in Dred Scott,70 which had struck down a 
congressional effort to limit slavery in the territories, but had an 
obligation to enforce the judgment upon the parties in the case itself. 
As Lincoln said in his debates with Stephen Douglas: 
We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave 
by the court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free . . . .  [B]ut we 
nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be 
binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall 
be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no 
measure that does not actually concur with the principles of 
that decision. 71 
In terms of academic views, it is probably fair to say that the 
majority of scholars support judicial supremacy: the Court enjoys 
interpretive supremacy such that its decisions bind the other branches 
not just in the case before it but all other similar cases.72 Professor 
Laurence Tribe speaks for most when he writes that "the Executive 
Branch must enforce the law according to the Executive's view of 
what the Constitution requires . . .  so long as the Executive does not 
thereby usurp the role of the Article III Judiciary as the ultimate 
expositor of the Constitution in actual cases and controversies."73 On 
the other end of the spectrum, Professor Michael Paulsen has adopted 
the Jacksonian position, rejecting both judgment supremacy and 
interpretive supremacy.74 
The Lincoln position has failed to attract many defenders, in part 
perhaps because it has proven difficult to explain why a President 
should be able to simultaneously disagree with the Court's 
interpretation of the Constitution, yet nonetheless remain under 
obligation to enforce the judgment. No doubt Lincoln himself was 
forced to reach this compromise by the need to appeal to Republican 
antipathy toward slavery without taking the radical political position 
of disregarding the Supreme Court entirely.75 Nonetheless, we think 
that Lincoln had matters just about right. Each branch, as a practical 
matter, must interpret the Constitution when performing its unique 
functions, and the Constitution does not set up one branch's decision 
on these issues above any other. Therefore, Lincoln was right to say 
70. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 ( 1856). 
71. Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas (Oct. 13, 1858), in 3 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 8, at 245, 255. 
72. See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LA w 726 (3d ed. 
2000); Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron 
Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387. 
73. TRIBE, supra note 72, at 726. 
74. Paulsen, supra note 6, at 226. 
75. DA YID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 199-202 (1995). 
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that the reasoning of Dred Scott did not bind his views or policies, as 
President, on the restriction of slavery in the territories. We also think, 
however, that Lincoln was right to conclude that executives had a 
responsibility to enforce the judgment in Dred Scott itself and return 
Dred Scott to his owner (even though we stress that we 
obviously disagree strongly with Chief Justice Taney's reading of 
the Constitution). 
Why? We believe this conclusion arises from the principle that the 
Constitution makes each branch supreme in performing its respective 
functions. The courts are supreme in resolving cases. We can criticize 
their judgments, but they are final and to be enforced because the 
Constitution commits the resolution of certain disputes to the courts. 
This point may become clearer when we examine the difference 
between a judgment and an opinion. The judgment is the necessary 
and legally operative action of the federal courts, and as such it is the 
only part of a decision which has constitutional force. It is the result of 
the judiciary's power to decide cases or controversies. The opinion is 
the court's explanation of why it reached that particular judgment. It is 
only an explanation for a judgment. Suppose federal courts only issued 
judgments and not opinions. The other branches would still have a 
constitutional duty to implement those judgments as the final exercise 
of a coordinate branch's constitutional authority. Scholarly focus on 
the opinion has clouded our understanding that only the judgment 
represents the court's final action. 
As we noted, other branches also have this kind of operational 
supremacy. An obvious example is the President's pardon power. A 
president may pardon someone on a wholly idiosyncratic and 
misguided understanding of the Constitution. Along with the official 
document of the pardon, the President might issue his opinion as to 
why the pardon was necessary to right an unconstitutional wrong. That 
opinion might directly conflict with the judiciary's interpretation of the 
same constitutional provision. Nonetheless the pardon is final and the 
judiciary cannot ignore it on the grounds that the President's 
constitutional reasoning is erroneous. For instance, suppose that the 
President interprets the Constitution as forbidding the prosecution of 
some individual and grants her a pardon. Suppose also that a future 
prosecutor under the control of a subsequent President believes a 
prosecution of that individual for the same offense is warranted. 
Neither the future prosecutor nor the judiciary can strike down or 
ignore the pardon on the grounds that the previous President misread 
the Constitution. One might question why the judiciary (or the future 
President) should be forced to adhere to the constitutional reasonings 
of the earlier President. But that is the wrong question. When the 
judiciary permits the defendant to raise the pardon as a defense, the 
judiciary does not thereby acquiesce to the prior President's 
constitutional interpretations. Instead the judiciary accords to the 
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pardon the power that the Constitution assigns to it - the power to 
prevent prosecution and punishment. 
The same is true for judgments. When the judiciary issues a 
judgment, others must regard it as the final disposition of a dispute. 
When the executive branch enforces a judgment, it performs a time­
honored executive function. In fact, to allow the executive branch to 
decline to enforce judgments at its own discretion might functionally 
transfer the authority to decide Article III cases or controversies to 
the President. A duty to enforce judgments does not mean that 
executive branch officers acquiesce in the constitutional readings 
underlying the judgment. One can enforce judgments even if one 
completely disagrees with the readings that lead to them. 
Is judgment supremacy but a hop, skip, and a jump away from 
interpretive supremacy? Won't presidents and Congress grow tired of 
taking executive and legislative action based on their independent 
constitutional interpretations when they predictably will lose 
before a court? Why bother with interpretive independence 
when acknowledging interpretive supremacy will help you win more 
cases in court? 
We do not believe that judgment finality inevitably leads to 
interpretive supremacy, any more than pardon finality leads to 
presidential supremacy. Because Congress and the President resolve 
many more questions of constitutional law, any acquiescence to 
interpretive supremacy for the courts must stem not from the 
consequences of judgment supremacy, but from something else. That 
something else might be a desire to devote time and resources to 
solving more pressing social problems for which electoral rewards may 
be higher. Or it might be a desire to avoid responsibility for having to 
resolve difficult constitutional questions for which many people hold 
intense, but conflicting, preferences. 
All this raises the question of what to do with judgments so far 
beyond the pale that most if not all would blanch at their enforcement. 
One is tempted to say that the Constitution somehow permits the 
President to ignore "crazy judgments" or judgments based on "crazy 
constitutional interpretations." But we will not give into this 
temptation. We believe the Constitution calls upon the President to 
enforce every judgment. We suspect that the founders never 
contemplated what to do when the judiciary issues completely 
unfounded judgments. They did grant the President plenary powers to 
counteract some extreme examples of oppression by the judiciary. So, 
for example, if the judiciary were to issue a judgment simply 
imprisoning someone without trial, the President has the power to 
pardon that person. But beyond pardons, the Framers did not 
explicitly grant the President the right to "review" judgments, and 
established instead the familiar rule of executive enforcement of 
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judgment. Presidential refusal to implement judgments is an 
extraconstitutional measure that ought to be reserved for only the 
most grave circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
What has been lacking in the recent surge of works calling for an 
end to judicial review is a sense of proportion. These works seem to 
argue that in order to end unwarranted judicial supremacy we must 
end judicial review. Apparently, Kramer believes the American 
people should return to mobbing; the only significant mobbing that 
appears to happen these days is in response to sporting events. A 
Tushnet,76 or a Post and Siegel,77 seem equally unrealistic in suggesting 
ways to take the Constitution away from the courts and to return it to 
Congress. At times, critics seem to hope that the courts themselves 
will repudiate judicial supremacy, something that appears extremely 
unlikely given the course of decisions over the past decade. 
We have a different proposal, one that builds upon our vision of 
the way in which the people can interpret the Constitution through 
methods endogenous to the Constitution. We agree with the Court's 
critics that our President, Congress, and courts should move away 
from the prevailing system of judicial supremacy in interpreting the 
Constitution. We think they are wrong, however, in calling for an end 
to judicial review in order to achieve that end. This is akin to arguing 
that we can preclude presidential interpretive supremacy by 
eliminating the veto power. Rather, we think the people should use 
the usual political processes created by the Constitution to restore 
departmentalism in constitutional interpretation. This could be done 
fairly easily through the judicial appointments process. The President 
simply could choose to nominate only those who agree that judicial 
interpretation of the Constitution is not binding on the other branches, 
and that each branch has the authority to interpret the Constitution 
when executing its own constitutional functions. The Senate could 
adopt this litmus test as well. Rather than merely worrying about 
whether a nominee is a strict constructionist or a follower of the living 
Constitution approach, both political parties could agree to nominate 
and appoint departmentalists. 
This would create a very different, but we think welcome, change 
in the current appointments process.78 Currently, presidents and 
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senators seem to be engaged in a delicate dance to outmaneuver each 
other. Presidents choose among candidates who share their judicial 
philosophy, which can range from satisfying a simple litmus test (such 
as supporting the right to abortion) to a general approach to 
interpretation (such as adhering to the Constitution's original 
understanding) . They then seek to nominate an individual whose 
paper record will not suggest that he or she shares extreme versions of 
the President's legal approach. Supreme Court nominees look forward 
to a grilling on their views on specific issues of importance to various 
interest groups. Senators devote their questions toward trying to ferret 
out a nominee's views, and might reject one whose views lie outside 
those of the median senator. Nomination hearings become a struggle 
between nominees who do not wish to pre-judge issues by committing 
to certain outcomes before they even reach the bench, and senators 
who want to pin them down on specific cases and doctrines. 
Our theory of departmentalism recommends a different approach. 
Rather than merely investigating a nominee's theories on 
constitutional interpretation or worrying whether a nominee would 
reach a specific outcome on a certain question, presidents and senators 
might agree to appoint nominees who did not believe in judicial 
supremacy. This might have several salutary effects. First, the judges 
themselves might become more respectful of the other branches' 
responsibility to interpret the Constitution. Second, Presidents and 
congresses might take their obligation to interpret the Constitution 
more seriously, and they might become more confident that they can 
act on their understandings. Third, it would have the healthy effect of 
repairing our broken judicial appointments process. Under a system of 
judicial supremacy, the judicial appointments process inevitably came 
to resemble political campaigns. If the Court has the final say on 
questions ranging from abortion to affirmative action to gay rights, the 
only way for groups interested in changing national policy on these 
questions is to alter the personnel on the Court. Under a system of 
judicial supremacy, control of Court appointments becomes one of the 
great political prizes in the contest over social policy. 
Finally, coordinate constitutional review would return at least 
some control over national policy on these highly contested issues to 
the political process. Efforts to change national policy would not only 
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seek change through the courts, but through the political branches. 
With coordinate-branch constitutional review, there would be three 
separate power centers for interpreting the Constitution, not just one. 
Political actors could then change constitutional interpretation in 
multiple ways, rather than only through the personnel of the Supreme 
Court. A party dissatisfied with the Court's decisions on abortion or 
affirmative action could seek their desired policy through executive 
orders or legislation, rather than through judicial decisions. While the 
judiciary would continue to issue judgments based on their reading of 
the Constitution, judges would abandon all pretenses that they are 
superior interpreters of the Constitution and that they are the 
Constitution's final arbiters. 
We do not wish to overclaim. Requiring interpretive humility from 
prospective nominees to the courts is hardly a panacea. The ultimate 
way of ending the judiciary's interpretive supremacy is to have the 
other branches and the people regain confidence in their own ability 
to interpret the Constitution. By accepting the seductive view that the 
courts may establish the Constitution's meaning for everyone else, the 
political branches have shirked their responsibilities. If the political 
branches (and the public) can shed the habit of deciding what the 
Constitution means almost solely by reference to what the courts have 
said, we will have gone a long way to ending interpretive supremacy. 
